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On-line Metrical Task System ( $S$ :
, $T$ : , $A$ :
, $B$ : , 80: ) ,
–
. $A,$ $B$ ,
, $i$ $x$ $a_{ix}$ ,







Borodin 6 ea On-line Metrical Task System $\xi$ Com-
petitive Ratio ,
$n$ On-line Metrical Task System
Competitive Ratio $8(n-1)$
[BLS92].
Zwick Paterson [ZP95] , On-line Met-
rical Task System adaptive adversary
, Mean PayoffGame
.
, Zwick , On-











2 On-line Metrical Task System
On-line Metrical Task System [BLS92] $kl3:$ , $n$
$k$ .
On-line Metrical Task System
$(S, T, A, B, s_{0})$ , $S=\{1,2, \cdots, n\}$
, $T=\{1,2, \cdots, k\}$
, $A$ , $A$ $a_{ij}$
$i$ $j$ .
$B$ , $B$ $i$
$j$ . $B$
, $(b_{ij}+b_{jk}\leq b_{ik})$
. , $s\mathrm{o}\in S$
.
1 .
step 1 $i$ , $k$
– $t$ .
step 2 $i$ $t$ .
step 3 $i$ $j$ .
, step 2 $i$ $t$
ait , step 3
$i$ $j$ $b_{ij}$ .
, 1 ait $+b_{ij}$
.
$I$ $t_{1}t_{2}t_{3}\ldots$ , $t_{i}$ $i$
. , $\sigma$ $s_{0}$
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$=(S, E)$ . MST $(i, j)$
$\in E$ , $2^{p-1}<b_{ij}\leq 2^{p}$
$2^{p}$ . MST’
. MST’
$2^{M}$ . b . $=2^{m}$
$-$ $2^{M-m}$ $\tau$
( ).






$\sigma$ X , -





Borodin $\text{ }$ ea [BLS92] $\text{ }$ On-line Metirical Task
System Competitive Ratio ,








$\tau$ – , $\tau=$’so $s_{1}$
$s_{2}$ . . . $s_{l},$ $(s\iota=S0),(s_{i}\neq s_{i+1},0\leq i\leq l-1)$
. $\tau$







Zwick Paterson On-line Metrical Task






, On-line Metrical Task Sys-
tem $=\{S,T, A, B\}\text{ }$ Mean Payoff Game, $G=$
$\{V_{1}, V_{2}, E\}$ .
$V_{1}=\{1,2, \ldots, n\}$ ,
I . $V_{2}=\{(x, y)|1\leq x\leq$
$n,$ $1\leq y\leq k\}$ , $-\text{ }-$ II
.
$V_{1}$ $V_{2}$ $xarrow(x, y),$ $x\in V_{1},$ $(x, y)\in$
$V_{2}$ $x$ ,
$y$ . $V_{2}$ $V_{1}$ $(x, y)$
$arrow z,$ $z\in V_{1},$ $(x, y)\in$ $y$
$x$ $z$ .
( ) , $xarrow(x, y)$
$0$ , (X, $y$ ) $arrow z$ $a_{xz}$
$+b_{zy}$ .
21 On-hine Metrical Task System
.
$S=\{1,2\},$ $T=\{1,2,3\},$ $A=\lfloor 52$ $51$ $21\rfloor$ ,
$B=\lceil 03$ $03\rceil$
Mean PayoffGame , 1
. , $V_{1}=\{1,2\}$ ,
$V_{2}=\{(1,1), (1,2), (1,3), (2,1), (2,2), (2,3)\}$ .
Mean Payoff Game , I
II
57
rical Task System $-$ Mean
Payoff Game ,
Zwick , $xarrow$
(X, $y$ ) $0$ , (X, $y$ ) $arrow z$
$a_{xz}+b_{xy}$ .
31 21 , 2
.












3 An Optimal Schedule against a Ran-
dom Taskmaster
, On-line Metrical Task System
. , On-hne Met-







, $\{1, 2, \cdots, k\}$

























, $\min E_{j}$ $-$ $j$
$\leq\leq \text{ }$ . , $E_{one}$
$E_{\mathrm{o}n\mathrm{e}j}= \min_{i1\leq\leq n}E$










$W_{i}$ , $(1 \leq j\leq n)$ ,
$i$
. $deg(i)$ MST $i$ ,
$1\leq i\leq n$ ,
$deg(i)2^{M-1}<W_{i}\leq deg(i)2^{M}$
.
























, $E_{\tau}= \frac{D_{\tau}}{T_{\tau}}$ ,
$2E_{on\mathrm{e}}$ $\leq E_{\tau}<$ $\frac{C_{\tau}}{2^{M-1}}E_{on\mathrm{e}}^{\cdot}$
.
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A Mean Payoff Game
Mean Payoff Game $G=(V_{1}, V_{2}, E)$ ,
$w$ : $Earrow R$ $a_{0}\in$






I , $V_{2}$ II .













$\mathrm{B}$ Discounted Payoff Game
Discounted Payoff Game(DPG) ea Mean Payoff
Game discounted version . Discounted Pay-
off Game $r^{\backslash }-$











DPG $G=(V_{1}, V_{2}, E)$ ,
$w$ : $Earrow R$ , $i\in V_{1}\cup V_{2}$ ,
$\lambda$ .





B.l $([\mathrm{Z}\mathrm{P}95])$ discounted payoffgame
-x $=\{X1, X2, \cdots, xn\}$ –
$\max_{(i,j)\in}E\{(1-\lambda)wij+\lambda_{X_{j}}\}$ if $i\in V_{1}$ ,
$\min_{(i,j)\in}E\{(1-\lambda)wij+\lambda x_{j}\}$ if $i\in V_{2}$ .
discounting factor $\lambda$ DPG $\mathcal{V}(\lambda)$
. $\lambda$ 1 $\mathcal{V}(\lambda)$ Mean Payoff Game
V , Mean PayoffGame Dis-
counnted PayoffGame [ZP95].
$\mathrm{C}$ discounted Payoff Games
discounted payoff game( DPG) DPG
. DPG
$G=$ $(V_{1}, V_{2}, V_{3}, E)$ , $w$ :
$Earrow R$ , $i\in V_{1}\cup V_{2}\cup V3$ ,
$\lambda$ . $V_{1}$
I , $V_{2}$
II . , $V_{3}$ $i$
$(i,j)$ $r_{ij}$ ,
$i$




$(1- \lambda)\sum_{i0^{\lambda^{i}}}^{\infty}=W(ei)$ . ,
,
DPG . $\cdot$ I
, II
.
$\mathrm{D}$ Discounted Payoff Game
D.l discounted payoff game $G=(V_{1}$ ,
$V_{2},$ $V_{3},$ $E)$ $- x=\{x_{1}, x_{2,n}\ldots, x\}$
– .
$x_{i}=\{$
$\max_{(i,j)\in E}\{(1-\lambda)wij+\lambda x_{j}\}$ if $i\in V_{1}$ ,
$\min_{(i,j)\in}E\{(1-\lambda)w_{i}j+\lambda x_{j}\}$ if $i\in V_{2}$ ,
$\sum_{(i,j)}\in Erij\{(1-\lambda)wij+\lambda x_{j}\}$ if $i\in V_{3}$ .
: $\mathcal{F}$ , $\overline{x}$ $\overline{y}$
.
$y_{i}=\{$
$\max_{(i,j)\in E}\{(1-\lambda)wij+\lambda x_{j}\}$ if $i\in V_{1}$ ,
$\min_{(i,j)\in}E\{(1-\lambda)wij+\lambda x_{j}\}$ if $i\in V_{2}$ ,
$\sum_{(i,j)\in E}r_{ij}\{(1-\lambda)wij+\lambda x_{j}\}$ if $i\in V_{3}$ .
61
, $\overline{x}=\mathcal{F}(\overline{x})$ $\overline{x}$
. $|| \overline{v}||=\max_{i}\{|v_{i}|\}$ ( ).
$\forall\overline{u},\overline{v},$ $||\mathcal{F}(\overline{u})-\mathcal{F}(\overline{v})||\leq\lambda||\overline{u}-\overline{v}||$
$\overline{x}$ $\overline{x}=\mathcal{F}(\overline{x})$ – . I
$i\in V_{1}$ $(1 -\lambda)wij$ +\mbox{\boldmath $\lambda$}




, -x $=\mathcal{F}(\overline{x})$ – .
$i\in V_{1}$













II $i\in V_{2}$ $(1-\lambda)w_{i}j+$
\mbox{\boldmath $\lambda$} $i$ ( $i$ , ,
$i$







DPG Simple Stochastic Game [Con92]
[ZP95] , ,
II DPG MAX&
AVE SSG , I
DPG MIN&AVE SSG






















D.4 DPG NP $\cap \mathrm{c}\mathrm{o}-$
$\mathrm{N}\mathrm{P}$ .
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